No Maintenance Without a Valid Marriage: Allahabad High Court Reiterates Statutory Limits of Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Introduction

The Allahabad High Court, in Madhu @ Aruna Bhajpai v. State of U.P. & Anr., reaffirmed the strict statutory boundaries governing maintenance claims under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that long cohabitation or social recognition cannot override clear statutory provisions, particularly when both parties to the alleged marriage have subsisting prior marriages. The ruling highlights the interplay between Section 125 Cr.P.C. and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and clarifies that equitable considerations cannot dilute explicit legislative mandates.

Factual Background (Brief)

The revisionist–applicant, Smt. Madhu alias Aruna Bhajpai, sought maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, claiming that she had been married to the second respondent and had cohabited with him as his wife for nearly a decade. Her case was founded on the assertion that she had dissolved her earlier marriage through a mutual family settlement and a notarised agreement, upon which she entered into a subsequent marital relationship with the respondent in 2009.

The record, however, revealed that the revisionist’s first marriage, solemnised in 1992 under Hindu rites, had never been legally dissolved. Although divorce proceedings were initiated under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the petition was dismissed in default, and no decree of divorce was ever passed. Consequently, the first marriage continued to subsist in law.

It also emerged that the respondent–husband had a subsisting prior marriage at the time of the alleged second marriage. Despite this, the parties lived together for several years, during which the revisionist’s name appeared as the respondent’s wife in certain official records and she was socially acknowledged as such. Following alleged acts of cruelty and desertion, the revisionist approached the Family Court seeking maintenance.

By order dated 12 February 2024, the Family Court rejected the maintenance application on the ground of non-maintainability, holding that the applicant did not qualify as a “wife” within the meaning of Section 125 Cr.P.C. Aggrieved thereby, the revisionist preferred the present criminal revision before the Allahabad High Court.

Core Statutory Provisions

1. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Statutory Threshold of “Wife”

Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a summary remedy enacted to prevent vagrancy and destitution; however, its application is conditioned upon the claimant falling squarely within the categories enumerated under the provision. The expression “wife” employed in Section 125 has consistently been interpreted to mean a legally wedded wife, save in narrowly defined judicial exceptions.

The Allahabad High Court reiterated that the beneficent character of Section 125 cannot be invoked to rewrite statutory eligibility. Where the marital relationship itself is void in law, the claimant cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 125 merely on the basis of prolonged cohabitation or social recognition. The Court relied on settled precedent to hold that judicial sympathy cannot substitute statutory compliance.

2. Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Effect of a Subsisting Prior Marriage

Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act mandates that neither party to a marriage should have a living spouse at the time of solemnisation. A violation of this foundational condition attracts the consequence stipulated under Section 11, rendering such a marriage void ab initio.

Applying these provisions, the Court found that both the revisionist and the respondent had subsisting prior marriages at the time of their alleged second marriage. Any subsequent marital ceremony, therefore, was void in the eyes of law and incapable of conferring the legal status of husband and wife. The Court emphasised that a void marriage creates no enforceable matrimonial rights, including the right to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

3. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Exclusivity of Judicial Divorce

The Court categorically rejected the plea that a marriage can be dissolved through a family settlement, mutual understanding, or notarised agreement. It reaffirmed that under Hindu law, marriage can be dissolved only by a decree of divorce passed by a competent court under Section 13 of the Act.

Since the revisionist’s divorce petition had been dismissed and no decree of divorce existed, her first marriage continued to subsist in law. The Court held that extra-judicial arrangements lack legal efficacy and cannot be relied upon to claim matrimonial benefits arising from a subsequent relationship.

4. Judicial Limits on Equitable Interpretation

While acknowledging that courts have, in exceptional cases, adopted a purposive interpretation of Section 125 Cr.P.C. to protect innocent claimants, the High Court clarified that such discretion is unavailable where the claimant is aware of, or herself bound by, a subsisting marital tie. Expanding the scope of Section 125 in such circumstances would directly conflict with the statutory scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Court thus reaffirmed that equity must operate within the framework of law, and that statutory prohibitions under personal law cannot be neutralised by equitable considerations.

Distinguishing Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse

The revisionist relied on Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, where the Supreme Court adopted a purposive interpretation of Section 125 Cr.P.C. to protect an innocent woman.

The High Court distinguished this precedent on statutory grounds:

• In Badshah, the claimant’s earlier marriage had already been dissolved, and she was kept in the dark about the husband’s subsisting marriage.
• In the present case, the revisionist admitted her subsisting marriage and had herself initiated divorce proceedings.

Hence, the equitable extension of Section 125 Cr.P.C. was held inapplicable.

Key Legal Principles Reaffirmed

• Section 125 Cr.P.C. is not a substitute for personal law; its beneficent object cannot override express statutory prohibitions.
• Void marriages under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act confer no spousal rights, including maintenance.
• Divorce can only be granted by a court decree, not by private arrangements.
• Long cohabitation or social recognition does not cure statutory illegality.
• Expanding Section 125 Cr.P.C. to cover such relationships would dilute the sanctity of marriage and legislative intent.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court’s decision reinforces the settled position that maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is statutorily circumscribed and cannot be claimed dehors personal law. While the provision is undoubtedly a social welfare measure, its application is contingent upon the claimant satisfying the legal status of a “wife”, which in turn is governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

By strictly applying Sections 5(i), 11, and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court held that a marriage contracted during the subsistence of an earlier marriage is void ab initio and incapable of generating matrimonial rights, including maintenance. The judgment draws a clear distinction between equitable relief in cases of deception and situations where the claimant herself continues to be bound by a subsisting marital tie.

The ruling serves as a reminder that judicial equity cannot override express statutory prohibitions, and that private arrangements or long cohabitation cannot substitute a legally valid marriage. In doing so, the Court preserves the legislative intent behind Section 125 Cr.P.C. while upholding the legal sanctity of marriage under Hindu law.

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